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Bank Power, Block Ownership, Boards and Financial Distress Likelihood: An 
Investigation of Spanish Listed Firms 
Abstract 
We investigate the effects of bank power, block ownership and board independence on the 
likelihood of financial distress. Using a matched sample design, we find that firms in which banks 
have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial distress. However, the bank 
power effects are moderated by block ownership and board independence. Specifically, on the one 
hand, financial distress due to bank power is lower for firms with greater ownership by pressure 
resistant blockholders and such blockholders appear to be the largest blockholder in the firm. The 
bank power effects are also lower in firms with greater outside directors and this appears to be 
primarily driven by proprietary directors than independent directors. On the other, we document 
evidence suggesting that the bank power effects are magnified for firms in which the board chair 
is a proprietary director aligned to non-financial blockholders or CEO/Chair, suggesting that banks 
might partly influence decisions via board chairs. Overall, the findings are consistent with bank 
power actions being detrimental to the firm, but the extent to which such actions harm the firm 
depends on the monitoring intentions of blockholders and/or board of directors. These findings 
have important implications for policymakers. 
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The aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis witnessed widespread financial distress of 
nonfinancial firms across countries, with huge effects on entire economies [International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), 2012]. While the causes were mainly blamed on macroeconomic factors (see Taylor, 
2009; Erkens et al., 2012), the monitoring role of boards and large shareholders was severely 
questioned (see United Nations, 2010; Aebi et al., 2012). The criticisms reflect the well-established 
view that effective corporate governance is critical for performance, including reducing financial 
distress (Dowell et al., 2011). However, studies examining the impact of board and ownership 
structures on financial distress have been inconclusive (see Elloumi and Gueyle, 2001; Fich and 
Slezak, 2008; Donker et al., 2009; Dowell et al., 2011; Abdullah et al., 2016). A shortcoming of 
these studies is that they do not consider a critical factor in the life of the firm—the role of banks. 
Although existing literature documents the importance of banks in the resolution of financial 
distress (see Kawai et al., 1996; Berlin et al., 1996; Peek and Rosengren, 2005), their role in the 
likelihood of financial distress remains largely unexplored. Yet, a strand of studies documents that, 
compared to their counterparts, firms in which banks have power, in particular hold both debt and 
equity, have lower value (Morck et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2009; Tribo and Casasola-Martinez, 2010; 
Luo et al., 2011) and pay higher interest charges on bank loans (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; 
Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Agrawal and Elston, 2001; Luo et al., 2011). These findings 
have been interpreted as indications of rent extraction by the bank.  
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining the governance role 
of powerful banks on financial distress in Spanish firms, a setting in which banks provide both 
debt and equity finance to the same firm. Franks and Mayer (2001) and Tribo et al. (2007) argue 
that this dual role gives banks considerable power to influence firm decisions even if they are not 
the largest shareholder—we refer to this hereinafter as bank power. Specifically, our focus is to 
explore the effects of bank power on the likelihood of financial distress. We also analyse, drawing 
from the multiple blockholder literature (e.g., Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bolton and von Thadden, 
1998) and board literature in general (e.g., Dowell et al., 2011; Mangena et al., 2012), whether and 
how the bank power effects on financial distress are moderated by block ownership and board 
structure. This literature suggests that blockholders and boards respond to actions that threaten 
firm survival. These issues are important given that financial distress is a precursor for bankruptcy 
which is harmful to stakeholders (Dowell et al., 2011; Hernandez-Tinoco and Wilson, 2013) and 





has consequences for the stability of the financial sector due to contagion effects and the entire 
economy (IMF, 2012).  
There are strong reasons for viewing banks as having substantial effects on financial distress. 
First, they provide debt finance that firms need for long-term growth, and often offer support via 
short-term maturity loans to help fund short term activities (Agarwal and Elston, 2001). In 
addition, they have the legal rights in cases of firms defaulting on obligations or violating debt 
covenants (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Second, in contextual settings such as Spain (so do 
Germany, Italy, Japan and others), banks are also allowed, in addition to their lending business, to 
directly hold equity in the same firm (Franks and Mayer, 2001). Thus, they also have voting rights 
as shareholders, and these voting rights are magnified by their holding of proxy votes for other 
(minority) shareholders (see Franks and Mayer, 1998, 2001; Tribo and Casasola-Martinez, 2010). 
All this taken together, banks have considerable power, which they are known to use to influence 
board or CEO appointments and influencing firm decisions (see Franks and Mayer, 2001; Tribo 
and Casasola-Martinez, 2010). In this context, their position in the firm is analogous to what 
Bebchuk et al. (2000) label controlling minority shareholders, that is, they have power to control 
firm decisions even when they are not the largest shareholders.  
The manner by which this power is deployed has consequences for financial distress. On the 
one hand, banks could use power to better monitor management actions (Diamond, 1984; Mahrt-
Smith, 2006). As lenders, they have privileged access to firm-specific information (Diamond, 
1984; 1991) which they can use to monitor and protect their lending portfolio. As equity providers, 
they have a residual claim on profits, hence the incentive to enhance firm-value (Mahrt-Smith, 
2006). To the extent that banks are exposed as both lender and equity-holder, it would be in their 
interests to use their power to ensure firm survival and reducing the impact on their balance sheets. 
They are better positioned to achieve this, because, as insiders, they are well-informed about the 
firm’s financial position and have power to take actions before problems become serious. In 
contrast, Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berlin et al. (1996) argue that banks use 
their power to extract rents. These works suggest that due to information asymmetry in the lending 
market, banks exploit informational advantages to maximise their revenue from the firm via higher 
charges. The presence of asymmetric information creates adverse selection problems, leading to 
higher switching costs and making it difficult for firms to switch lenders (Schenone, 2010). This 
presents banks with opportunities to charge higher interest (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; 





Agrawal and Elston, 2001). Kashyap et al. (2008) argue that the incentives are exacerbated because 
banks (and their managers) are evaluated based on the lending income they generate. This 
encourages them to take strategies that enhance their short-term performance at the expense of the 
borrower’s long-term performance (Stein, 1989).  
Empirically, some studies document evidence of effective monitoring (e.g., Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1997; Ivashina et al., 2009; Pan and Tian, 2015), while others suggest rent extraction 
or reduced monitoring intensity by the banks (e.g., Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Morck et al., 2000; 
Tribo et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011). Thus, the extent to which bank power 
alleviates or precipitates financial distress remains unclear. We explore this issue using a matched 
sample of listed Spanish financially distressed and non-financially distressed firms. We extend the 
analyses to understand whether block ownership and board structure influence the bank power-
financial distress relationship. We draw insights from the multiple blockholders literature that 
builds models of contests and coalitions that have implications for the firm (see Pagano and Roell, 
1998; Bolton and von Thadden, 1998; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). In line with this literature, we 
suggest that to the extent that bank actions harm the firm, blockholders will monitor and contest 
such actions. The constructs of block ownership we examine are size of ownership, type of 
blockholder (i.e. pressure sensitive, pressure resistant and non-financial blocks) and dispersion of 
blockholders in the firm. Further, we also draw from studies that focus on the importance of board 
structure when firm survival is threatened (Dowell et al., 2011; Mangena et al., 2012). To the 
extent that banks extract rents (Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Barucci and Mattesini, 
2008), the existence of bank power can be viewed as a threat. In this case, we focus on board 
independence as proxied by CEO/Chair duality, proprietary director board chair and outside 
directors (both proprietary and independent directors).1 In our analyses, however, we accept that 
banks may form coalitions with these mechanisms to reduce monitoring intensity (Pagano and 
Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). Thus, bank power effects on financial distress 
must depend on monitoring incentives of blockholders or boards.  
We find a positive relationship between bank power and financial distress likelihood—that 
is, firms in which banks have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial 
distress. We also find evidence linking blockholder power and board independence to reduced 
 
1 In Spain outside directors are of two types: proprietary directors appointed by the largest shareholders to represent their interests and independent 
directors appointed to represent the interests of minority shareholders [see Unified Corporate Governance Code, 2013]. 





financial distress due to bank power. Thus, the bank power effects on financial distress are 
moderated by these two governance mechanisms. Specifically, we find that for firms with high 
block ownership, financial distress due to bank power is less likely and such effects are primarily 
due to pressure resistant blockholders. These are also more likely to be the largest blockholder in 
the firm. We also find that the bank power effects are more pronounced for firms with proprietary 
director board chair (particularly those aligned to non-financial blocks) or CEO/Chair whereas the 
opposite occurs for firms with more outside directors. Similar to blockholders, the effects of 
outside directors are due to pressure resistant proprietary directors. Overall, the results suggest that 
bank power increases financial distress likelihood, but the effects are moderated by governance 
mechanisms. These results are robust to several additional tests.   
Our work offers several contributions to the literature. First, we extend studies examining 
the impact of bank power on firm outcomes such as performance (Morck et al., 2000; Lin et al., 
2009), R&D investments (Tribo et al., 2007), executive perks (Luo et al., 2011) and investment 
efficiency (Pan and Tian, 2015). We differ from these studies in that we examine, not only the 
effects of bank power, but also how bank power interacts with other governance structures to 
influence organisational outcomes. Our findings suggesting that bank power effects depend on 
monitoring by blockholders and independent boards are an extension to these prior works. Second, 
we add to the literature on the role of multiple blockholders in monitoring (e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 
2005; Konijn et al., 2011; Basu et al., 2016, 2017). Specifically, we complement this literature by 
showing that in a setting where banks have power, blockholders and boards provide the 
mechanisms to monitor bank actions. Third, we also open an interesting avenue on the role of 
proprietary director chairs. Whereas prior literature focuses on the CEO/Chair dichotomy, we 
extend this by examining the role of the proprietary director chair and our results suggesting that 
proprietary director chairs may be detrimental to the firm are new and interesting. Finally, our 
work relates to studies that examine the role of banks in the resolution of financial distress (e.g., 
Hoshi et al., 1990; Berlin et al., 1996; Hower, 2016). We differ by our focus on financial distress 
likelihood. In this case, we inform these studies by showing that banks may as well bear 
responsibility for financial distress.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the contextual setting in 
Spain. In Section 3, we discuss the theory and develop our hypotheses. We next describe our data 





and empirical models in Section 4, and then present and discuss the findings in Section 5. Finally, 
we end by providing concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
Spain is a natural setting for our study for two reasons. First, Spanish firms suffered the most 
during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis compared to other countries, and over a prolonged 
period (see IMF, 2012). From the firm’s perspective, the financial crisis was an unexpected 
exogenous turbulence that exposed firms to higher risk of failure. Dowell et al. (2011) and 
Mangena et al. (2012), among others, argue that it is in these turbulence environments that 
corporate governance is apposite and can be better understood. Second, the Spanish governance 
system offers a unique and interesting context in which to understand how control dynamics in the 
firm affects outcomes, including financial distress (see also Tribo et al., 2007). These control 
dynamics (discussed below) could provide some insights into why some firms went into financial 
distress while others did not. 
 In terms of the corporate governance system, Spain falls within the insider-dominated model, 
yet some of its features are like the outsider-dominated model (see Tribo et al., 2007). As in 
countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan, banks play a major role in the financial markets and 
are important in the governance of other firms. In many Spanish firms, banks provide both debt 
finance and equity to the same firm, sometimes as significant (and controlling) shareholders (Tribo 
et al., 2007; Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 2009; Tribo and Casasola-Martinez, 2010). In 
relation to this, Crespi-Cladera and Garcia-Cestona (2002) document that banks directly own on 
average 5.2% of equity in non-financial firms. Similarly, Azofra et al. (2007) show that nearly half 
of Spanish listed firms have a bank shareholder owning about 10% of equity. Further, banks also 
hold proxy votes for minority shareholders (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Tribo and Casasola-
Martinez, 2010). Thus, together, banks’ voting rights are often above their cash flow rights. 
According to Franks and Mayer (2001), while their equity holdings may be modest, the 
combination of debt, equity (including proxy votes) endows them with considerable control power 
over firm decisions. Tribo and Casasola-Martinez (2010) suggest that banks do use this power to 
appoint their own directors to boards. This set-up makes banks insiders and well-informed about 
the firm and places them in better and stronger position to monitor managers (Diamond, 1984; 





1991) or alternatively, to extract rents from the firms (Rajan, 1992; Bertin et al., 1996; Tribo and 
Casasola-Martinez, 2010).  
 On balance, given the dual role, the monitoring incentive should dominate as banks would 
be motivated to protect both their loan and equity holding portfolios. This is particularly important 
because the Spanish Insolvency Act 22/2003 (Article 93) [BOE (Official State Bulletin), 2003] 
classifies shareholders with debt claims and owning at least 5% of equity as subordinated creditors. 
This means that they are not preferred in cases of bankruptcy. However, according to Garcia-
Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014), banks circumvent the Act by biasing their lending towards 
secured loans. In this context, bank debt secured over assets is the most common form of lending, 
and banks use foreclosures to recover debts when firms are in difficulty.  
A second important feature of the governance system is that share ownership is concentrated 
in a few blockholders, including families, individuals, corporates and financial institutions (such 
as banks, insurance funds, mutual funds, pension funds) (Crespi-Cladera and Garcia-Cestona, 
2002; Tribo et al., 2007; Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 2009). On average, these 
blockholders, hold about 33.5% of equity of Spanish listed firms (CVNM, 2018) and are allowed 
to, and do, appoint outside directors (called proprietary directors) to represent their interests on the 
board (as provided for in the Unified Corporate Governance (UCG) Code, 2013). According to the 
CVNM (2018), proprietary directors in Spanish listed firms account for about 33.6% of 
directorships. In this context, like dual banks, these blockholders can be viewed as well-informed 
players in the firm. To the extent that banks seek to extract rents from firms, these blockholders 
and their proprietary directors are likely to be critical in monitoring. As work on multiple 
blockholders shows, non-controlling blockholders can reduce the rent extraction actions of the 
controlling blockholder (e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Konijn et al., 2011; Basu et al., 2016, 
2017). Indeed, Leech and Manjon (2002) point that in Spain blockholders do collaborate via 
agreements pooling their voting rights to monitor firms’ decisions. In line with this, the CVNM 
(2018) documents that such agreements affect 31.9% of share capital of listed firms.  
Finally, like the Anglo-American model, the Spanish law provides for a unitary board 
structure, with a majority of outside directors (see Capital Companies Law, 2010; UCG Code, 
2013). Outside directors are distinguished into two main types—proprietary directors and 
independent directors. As noted above, proprietary directors (about 33.6% of directors) are 
appointed by the largest shareholders to represent their interests. The independent directors (about 





42.7% of directors) are appointed to represent the interests of minority shareholders. Both these 
directors have a fiduciary duty to monitor as well as to advise management (Pucheta-Martinez and 
Garcia-Meca, 2014). However, because they represent interests of constituents whose objectives 
may differ, their incentives to monitor may also differ. Another feature of board structure in Spain 
is that CEO/Chair duality is a common practice. CNMV (2018) shows that nearly 48.9% of listed 
firms have duality of functions. 
 
3. Theory and hypotheses 
Traditionally, the governance literature has focused substantial attention on understanding the 
agency problems between dispersed shareholders and managers. However, a recent body of 
research documents that in many countries (e.g., Japan, Spain, Germany and others), firms are 
owned by a few large shareholders and firms with controlling blockholders are a common 
phenomenon (see Franks and Mayer, 2001; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Basu et al., 2017). In such 
countries, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Burkart et al. (1997) argue that the agency problems are 
instead between the controlling blockholders and minority shareholders. Bebchuk et al. (2000) 
note that such agency problems are acute when the controlling blockholder is a controlling 
minority blockholder—that is, they are not the largest blockholder, but their voting rights exceed 
their cash-flow rights allowing them to control the firm. Whereas the controlling minority 
blockholder may use their control power to either monitor or extract rents, Bertrand et al. (2002) 
document evidence of substantial expropriation in firms with a controlling minority blockholder. 
We apply this to develop our hypotheses.  
 
3.1 Bank power and financial distress likelihood 
The position of banks in Spain is analogous to that of the controlling minority shareholders (see 
Section 2). While their equity holdings are modest (Leech and Manjon, 2002; Azofra et al., 2007), 
they have control power derived from being both lenders and equity holders in the same firm, 
coupled by their holding of proxy votes for other shareholders. This set up gives them power to 
appoint their own directors to the boards (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Tribo and Casasola-Martinez, 
2010). This power makes them better informed as insiders and can permit stringent monitoring, 
reducing suboptimal decisions and enhancing performance (e.g., Diamond, 1984; 1991; Ivashina 
et al., 2009). Not only do they have incentives to protect their large lending portfolios, they are 





also residual claimants on the firm’s profits, thus magnifying their incentives to monitor (Agrawal 
and Elston, 2001; Mahrt-Smith, 2006; Pan and Tian, 2015). This is critical because if the firm fails, 
the bank would suffer huge losses which it has to realise on the balance sheet with implications 
for capital adequacy ratios and its stability (Peek and Rosengren, 2005).  
 On the dark side, however, the power might exacerbate conflicts between the bank, as 
debtholder, and other shareholders. As suggested in Morck et al. (2000) and Mahrt-Smith (2006) 
among others, because the banks’ lending business typically dominates its equity positions, they 
may find it beneficial to maximise their lending portfolio at the expense of the firm. For instance, 
they may charge above market interest rates on bank loans maximising their revenue income from 
the firm at the expense of long-term firm performance (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Degryse and 
Van Cayseele, 2000). Kashyap et al. (2008) suggest that this is particularly attractive because the 
banks’ (and its managers) performance is evaluated, in part, based on income generated from 
lending. Consequently, as argued in Stein (1989), this may lead bank managers to behave 
myopically, taking strategies that earn high short-term revenue income for the bank, but at the 
expense of the borrower’s long-term performance. 
 The empirical evidence is similarly contrasting in its conclusions. There are studies 
documenting bank power as beneficial to the firm. For example, bank power is shown to associate 
with higher asset restructuring in periods of poor performance (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997), 
improve value creation in M&A activities (Ivashina et al., 2009) and facilitate value enhancing 
investment choices (Pan and Tian, 2015). Yet a growing body of work points towards rent 
extraction by the bank. For instance, banks are shown to encourage firms to take additional debt 
at above market interest rates (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; 
Agrawal and Elston, 2001). Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) show evidence consistent with 
banks encouraging firms to keep large cash balances whilst inducing them to use bank loans to 
fund capital projects and using the cash to pay the debts. Luo et al. (2011) document that firms in 
which banks have power pay higher executive perks as well as higher interest on bank debt. Other 
studies report that equity ownership by banks is associated with lower value (e.g., Morck et al., 
2000; Limpaphayom and Polwitoon, 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Tribo and Casasola-Martinez, 2010).  
Although the evidence on rent extraction appears to dominate, the extent to which such bank 
actions precipitate financial distress needs to be understood in the context of the cost-benefit trade-
off to the bank. Financial distress (and potentially bankruptcy) would not only end the revenue 





income streams but could also result in substantial capital losses for the bank. Given this, we would 
expect the bank to balance the implied costs of financial distress with the benefits of extracting 
higher interest income from the firm. This is particularly the case because the Insolvency Act 
(Article 93) (BOE, 2003) classifies debt claims as subordinated if the bank also owns at least 5% 
of firm equity. This means that in the event of firm bankruptcy, the bank is not a preferred 
creditor—thus, the loss to the bank could be huge. However, the empirical work suggests banks 
extract rents (see Tribo et al., 2007; Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 2009; Tribo and 
Casasola-Martinez, 2010). One reason is that banks circumvent the Act by offering debt secured 
over assets and using foreclosures to recover debts if firms are in difficulty. This strategy reduces 
the costs of financial distress to the bank (Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014). This leads 
us to predict that: 
H1: Bank power increases the likelihood that a firm enters financial distress. 
 
3.2 The moderating role of block ownership and board independence on bank power effects 
In Hypothesis 1, we assume the absence of mechanisms to monitor the actions of the powerful 
bank. This is the common assumption that most studies examining the impact of bank power on 
firm outcomes take (see Morck et al., 2000; Limpaphayom and Polwitoon, 2004; Tribo et al., 2007; 
Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011; Pan and Tian, 2015). However, multiple blockholder studies such 
as Pagano and Roell (1998), Maury and Pajuste (2005), and Basu et al. (2016), among others, 
suggest that blockholders provide invaluable monitoring that could curb rent extraction by the 
controlling power. In addition, the board structure literature argues that in the face of threats to 
firm survival, boards become more vigilant and monitor (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dowell et al., 
2011; Mangena et al., 2012). Thus, to the extent that bank power presents a setting where firm 
survival is threatened, blockholders and boards would monitor and contest actions that harm the 
firm. We draw from this literature to build our hypotheses in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Bank power-block ownership effects on financial distress likelihood  
The motivation for blockholders to monitor the bank (as the controlling power) derives, not only 
from a desire to protect their investments (Hoskisson et al., 2002), but also from the fact that they 
are rivals for control. Pagano and Roell (1998) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998) demonstrate 
that these blockholders are critical in curbing actions that harm the firm. In our case, blockholder 





monitoring implies that bank rent extraction cannot persist and harm the firm—it is contested. The 
blockholders can, for example, threaten to (i) take-over the firm (see Cremers and Nair, 2005), (ii) 
sell their shares (John and Kedia, 2006) or (iii) pressure managers to switch firm business to other 
banks (Schenone, 2010). This can be achieved by pooling their voting rights to act as a group (see 
Leech and Manjon, 2002; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010) or as individual blockholders if they have 
enough large ownership (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Basu et al., 2017). However, as modelled in 
the Pagano and Roell (1998) and Maury and Pajuste (2005), the opportunity also exists for the 
bank to form coalitions with the blockholders to reduce monitoring intensity. This is possible if 
the blockholders have business ties with the firm, a common feature in the Spanish context (see 
Tribo et al., 2007; Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 2009). For example, the bank may 
encourage managers to offer favourable supply contracts to the blockholders’ business interests 
(Pagano and Roell, 1998; Tribo and Martinez, 2010). 
The ability of blockholders to monitor and contest the bank must depend on blockholder 
power (i.e., size of ownership, blockholder dispersion) and their monitoring intentions (see Tribo 
et al., 2007; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Basu et al., 2016). The size of block ownership matters 
as it confers substantial voting control of the firm. It carries with it the ability to contest decisions 
or even to threaten certain actions, leading to change of direction (Cremers and Nair, 2005; John 
and Kedia, 2006; Schenone, 2010) and therefore could deter rent extraction. Thomsen et al. (2006) 
and Cornett et al. (2007), among others, argue that blockholder intervention or contest depends on 
their monitoring intentions. Consequently, they divide blockholders into types based on their 
monitoring objectives, in particular, nonfinancial and financial blockholders. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Thomsen et al. (2006) suggest that nonfinancial blockholders (individual, family, 
corporates) are associates and have incentives to extract private benefits. Some evidence shows 
that these blockholders are prone to lower firm value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005) or forming coalitions with the controlling power and lowering firm value (Basu et 
al., 2017). On the contrary, Anderson and Reed (2003) show that they are beneficial to value—
they find, in particular, that family firms perform better than counterparts. 
Meanwhile, financial blockholders (investment funds, pension funds, insurance funds, 
mutual funds) are suggested as effective monitors. However, their monitoring intentions also 
differ. Accordingly, Cornett et al. (2007) and Bhattacharya and Graham (2009), among others, 
further classify them into ‘pressure-sensitive’ blockholders (banks, insurance funds) and ‘pressure-





resistant’ blockholders (pension funds, mutual funds). Pressure-sensitive blockholders have either 
existing or potential business ties with firms, which compromises their monitoring. In contrast 
pressure-resistant blockholders only have investment interest in the firm and are therefore 
unconstrained in their monitoring (Bhattacharya and Graham, 2009). Cornett et al. (2007) and 
Manzaneque et al. (2016) show, respectively, that pressure-resistant blockholders enhance firm 
performance and reduce financial distress, while Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) document that 
pressure-sensitive blockholders have the opposite effect.  
With regards to blockholder dispersion, the literature argues and documents that dispersion 
reduces monitoring effectiveness. Tribo et al. (2007) argue that a large dispersion makes 
coordination and consensus on decisions among blockholders more difficult. As a result, their 
power to monitor and contest value destroying actions is weakened. This presents opportunities 
for the controlling power to extract rents. Studies such as Tribo et al. (2007), Konijn et al. (2011) 
and Basu et al. (2016) document evidence to support this. They show that blockholder dispersion 
is negatively related to firm performance. These discussions lead us to predict:  
H2: The extent to which bank power increases the likelihood of financial distress depends on 
blockholder power and their monitoring incentives.  
 
3.2.2 Bank power-board independence effects on financial distress likelihood 
A well-documented view is that boards are a critical in the governance of firms. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Jensen (1993) argue that boards are at the apex of the firm and are bestowed the 
fiduciary duty to monitor. Within this context, the repeated argument is that the willingness and 
ability of boards to monitor the firm is a function of their independence (Fama and Jensen; 1983; 
Jensen, 1993; Dowell et al., 2011; Black and Kim, 2012; Mangena et al., 2012). Two factors that 
are apposite for board independence are board leadership and outside directors.  
 In terms of leadership, the Spanish context presents two dimensions—the CEO/Chair duality 
and the proprietary director chair. The CEO/Chair duality refers to whether the roles of board chair 
and CEO are combined or separated. On the one hand, role duality bequeaths too much power to 
one person, hindering the board’s ability to monitor the CEO (Jensen, 1993; Brickley et al., 1997) 
and creating opportunities for the CEO to extract rents (Fama and Jensen, 1983). If role duality 
weakens board monitoring, rent extraction by the bank may thrive in firms with CEO/Chair. The 
bank could capitalise and motivate the CEO to implement strategies that benefit itself—for 





instance it could commit to influence CEO pay decisions. Luo et al. (2011) document higher 
executive perks in firms with bank power and that such firms also pay higher interest rates on bank 
loans. On the other hand, role duality is argued to provide a unified power of command that 
improves board efficiency (Anderson and Anthony, 1986; Bach and Smith, 2007). This power is 
a resource that puts the CEO/Chair in a stronger position to lead and enhance firm survival. The 
motivation for the CEO/Chairs to work effectively with the board to ensure firm survival is much 
stronger as they would typically have undiversifiable personal wealth tied up in the firm 
(Easterbrook, 1984). In the event of financial distress, the CEO/Chair would suffer substantial 
reputation damage in the market for directorships (Easterbrook, 1984; Dowell et al., 2011). They 
would also be hurt through loss in the value of their shares. These should provide incentives to 
mitigate the effects of bank power actions. In support of this, Dowell et al. (2011) document that 
firms with CEO/Chair are more likely to survive following financial distress. 
 The implications of the proprietary director board chair have not, as far as we are aware, 
been addressed in the literature. Prior work has focused on the CEO/Chair dichotomy. However, 
although proprietary directors are non-executive, they represent the interests of the most important 
(or powerful) shareholders—the blockholders (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2014; Fuente et al., 2017). 
In this context, we consider the appointment of a proprietary director board chair as important as 
having a combined chair and CEO. In concentrated ownership settings, the blockholders are 
viewed as insiders and using their power to benefit themselves at the expense of the minority 
shareholders (Burkart et al., 1997; Bertrand et al., 2002; Tribo et al., 2007). Thus, a proprietary 
director chair who represents the controlling blockholder would have strong influence over 
management decisions as well as board decisions. Hence, this can be viewed as creating a powerful 
individual who on one hand can enhance board monitoring of management and on the other can 
hinder board monitoring intensity in order to serve the interests of their blockholders. In support 
of this, Franks and Mayer (1998) document evidence, in the context of Germany, suggesting that 
banks were able to influence decisions by using their appointed supervisory board chair.    
In relation to outside directors, the conventional wisdom is that these are better monitors and 
are the first line of defence against rent extraction (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). Not 
only do they monitor, they also bring greater critical resources (e.g., experience, knowledge and 
networks) for the CEO to draw advice (Black and Kim, 2012; Mangena et al., 2012). To this extent, 
outside directors should reduce financial distress due to bank power. For example, they can use 





their knowledge and networks to link the firm to a varied source of external funding and reducing 
the firm’s reliance on a single bank. Prior studies provide evidence showing the important 
monitoring role that these directors perform to enhance firm value (see Dowell et al., 2011; Black 
and Kim, 2012), and particularly in settings where firm survival is threatened (see Donker et al., 
2009; Dowell et al., 2011). Others have shown that outside directors improve the quality of 
reporting (García Osma and Gill-de-Abornoz Noguer, 2007; Pucheta-Martinez and Garcia-Meca, 
2014; Fuente et al., 2017).  
As earlier noted, in Spain, outside directors are of two types—independent and proprietary 
directors (see Section 2). While both monitor (Pucheta-Martinez and Garcia-Meca, 2014; Fuente 
et al., 2017), the role of proprietary directors needs to be understood in the context of the 
monitoring objectives of their appointing blockholders. Thus, one should expect these directors to 
protect or drive the interests of their blockholders. For instance, monitoring by directors 
representing pressure-sensitive blockholders or nonfinancial blockholders may be inhibited by 
business ties with the firm. To the extent that the bank, as the controlling power, influences the 
business ties, these proprietary directors may vote with the bank or management (Brickley et al., 
1997). In contrast, directors appointed by pressure-resistant blockholders would monitor given the 
arm’s length relationship with the firm. Pucheta-Martinez and Garcia-Meca (2014) and Fuente et 
al. (2017) document that pressure-resistant directors are associated with quality reporting. 
Manzaneque et al. (2016) show that these directors are related to lower financial distress. García 
Osma and Gill-de-Abornoz Noguer (2007) reveal that board independence is associated with less 
earnings management while Dowell et al. (2011) shows that the likelihood of surviving financial 
distress increases with independent directors. The preceding discussions lead us to predict:  
H3: The extent to which bank power increases the likelihood of financial distress depends on 
board independence. 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Data and sample construction 
We draw our data from nonfinancial firms listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE) for the 
period spanning years 2007—2015. Prior to 2005, Spanish listed firms were using local accounting 
standards instead of international accounting standards. Therefore, using data post-2005 allows us 





to circumvent measurement problems relating to the use of financial data generated from using 
different accounting standards. Our dataset starts in 2007 instead of 2005 because of the way we 
construct the measure for financial distress as explained below.  
We follow prior work (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994; Pindado et al., 2008; IMF, 2012) and 
define financial distress as the ability of the firm to meet its financial obligations. To develop our 
financial distress measure, we adopt the approach developed in Pindado et al. (2008). This measure 
is ex-ante and is based on two main conditions. First, earnings before interest and taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) must be lower than the interest expense (i.e., interest 
cover ratio) for two consecutive years. The second condition is that the firm’s market value suffers 
negative growth for two consecutive years. Both conditions need to be satisfied for a firm to be 
considered financially distressed. Opler and Titman (1994) use a similar measure of financial 
distress, but their conditions are based on sales growth and stock returns. Both Opler and Titman 
(1994) and Pindado et al. (2008) argue that the negative market value growth is important in order 
to eliminate downturns in performance that are not long-term in nature. Similarly, the interest 
cover ratio is required to eliminate firms that are healthy but experience negative market value 
growth due to prior optimistic market expectations. This measure of financial distress has also 
been applied in prior studies (e.g., Hernandez-Tinoco and Wilson, 2013; Manzaneque et al., 2016).  
To apply Pindado’s model, we collected EBITDA and interest expense data from the Sistema 
de Analisis de Balance Ibericos (SABI) database and stock market values from the SSE. We 
identified a total of 198 firms that met our financial distress definition. Upon inspection, some 
firms appeared multiple times because they remained classified as in financial distress in 
subsequent years. As our focus is on financial distress likelihood, we eliminate all subsequent firm-
years so that a firm appears once in our sample—that is the first year in which it is classified as in 
distress. This process yielded 109 financially distressed firms. We next adopt a matched-pair 
research design to build our final sample (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2001) and 
match each of the financially distressed firms with a non-financially distressed (control) firm in 
the same industry, with similar total assets and in the same time-period (year).2 In this process, we 
lost additional firms for which suitable matching firms (11 firms) could not be identified and firms 
 
2As in Peasnell et al. (2001), we used a cut-off of +/- 50% in the matching process. We tested, using a paired t-test, for differences in total assets of 
distressed and non-distressed firms. We find the two samples do not differ significantly suggesting that the matching process was successful.  





with some missing data (6 firms). This reduced our sample to 184 financially distressed firms and 
non-financially distressed firms (i.e., 92 matched pairs) (hereafter distressed or non-distressed). 
Our rationale for adopting a matched-pair design is that it provides a parsimonious means of 
controlling for potentially important confounding factors (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; 
Peasnell et al., 2001). In our case, because the study covers the period during, and following, the 
2007-2009 financial crisis, the challenge would be to control for the impact of macroeconomic 
factors during this period, which adversely affected firms. By using the matched-pair research 
design, we can reasonably circumvent this problem—firms are matched based on the year, industry 
and size so that the confounding factors are the same. Further, the modelling approach we adopt—
conditional logistic regression (section 4.2 below), has the advantage of preserving the matched 
character of the sample (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2001). To this extent, we 
can attribute some of the financial distress to governance structures. 
 
4.2 Empirical specification and variable definitions 
Following on from our matched-pair design, we employ a conditional logistic regression model. 
Our base model is depicted in Equation 1.  
FinDistresst = β1Bank powert-2+ β2Block ownershipt-2 + β3Board independencet-2 
+ βxBlock ownershipt-2*Bank powert-2 + βyBoard independencet-2*Bank 
powert-2 + Ʃ βzControl variablest-2 + Ɛ         (1) 
 
The dependent variable, FinDistress, is financial distress likelihood measured as a dummy taking 
the value of 1 if a firm is classified as distressed, 0 otherwise (see section 4.1 above). In relation 
to the independent variables, Bank power captures the presence of a dual role bank in the firm. 
Spanish firms are required by the Real Decreto 1514/2007 (BOE, 2007) law to indicate in the 
annual report whether any shareholder owning at least 5% of shares is also a holder of debt claims 
in the firm. In defining bank power, we take the view that the bank does not have to be the largest 
blockholder to dominate decisions (see also Franks and Mayer, 1998, 2001).3  
 
3We noted earlier, following Franks and Mayer (2001) and Tribo et al. (2010) that banks also derive their power from holding proxy votes. However, 
in defining bank power in the paper, we only considered whether the bank plays a dual role, that is, whether it is both lender and direct shareholder 
to the same firm. Data on proxy votes held by banks is not publicly available. To the extent that our bank power measure does not capture the proxy 
votes, this is a limitation of the paper.  





Focusing on governance variables, Block ownership denotes measures that capture the power 
of all blockholders (other than the dual role bank itself), with at least 5% ownership of the firm’s 
shares. Following the literature, we take the view that both the level of block ownership and 
blockholder dispersion matter for monitoring (see Tribo et al., 2007; Konijn et al. 2011; Basu et 
al., 2016). Hence, our measure of block ownership includes three constructs: (i) total share of all 
blockholders (Total blocks), which is also split into pressure sensitive financial blockholders 
(PresSensit blocks), pressure resistant financial blockholders (PresResist blocks) and non-financial 
blockholders (Non-financial blocks) to capture the effects of blockholder type; (ii) the total 
ownership by the top three blocks (Top3 blocks) as well as the individual share of the first, second 
and third largest blockholder (Block 1, Block 2 and Block 3) and (iii) the dispersion of 
blockholders, measured in Number of blocks and Herfindahl index of equity stakes. We use the 
scaled Herfindahl index as in Konijn et al. (2011), calculated using the total ownership of the top 
three largest blockholders. 4  Board independence captures the extent to which directors are 
independent and is proxied by CEO/Chair duality, Proprietary director chair and Outside 
directors. Outside directors are split into independent directors and proprietary directors. 
Block ownership*Bank power and Board independence*Bank power are interaction terms, 
which we include to capture the effects of bank power given the firm’s block ownership and board 
independence, respectively. We interpret a negative coefficient on the interaction term as 
indicating contests to bank power by the blockholders and boards and a positive coefficient as 
indicating weak monitoring or possibly coalitions between the bank and the mechanisms to reduce 
monitoring intensity. The sum of the coefficients of bank power (β1) and interaction terms (i.e., 
β1+βx; β1+βy) captures the total effects of bank power when contests exist. If contests of bank 
power are strong (not strong) enough, we expect the total effects to be negative (positive). We test 
the significance of these effects using the Wald test (see Mangena et al., 2012). 
Finally, we control for other variables that are motivated by prior studies. Managerial 
ownership is reported as positively related to financial distress (e.g., Abdullah, 2006; Fich and 
Slezak, 2008) and profitability, retained earnings and financial expense ratio are all shown to relate 
to financial distress (Opler and Titman, 1994; Pindado et al., 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013; 
Manzaneque et al., 2016). All variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
4The Herfindahl index= [(%Block 1)² +  (%Block 2)² +  (%Block 3)²]/[(%Block 1) +  (%Block 2) +  (%Block 3)] (see Konijn et al. (2011). A higher 
number of blocks or lower Herfindahl index implies a high dispersion of blockholders in the firm. 






Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
A concern in our design relates to potential endogeneity problems inherent in most studies of this 
nature. In particular, the literature indicates board and ownership structure variables are often 
endogenously determined by performance (see Field and Sheehan, 2004). Thus, there are 
possibilities that the board and ownership variables and financial distress are jointly determined. 
In other words, firms may have changed their board and/or ownership structures in order to deal 
with their financial difficulty. For instance, banks have been shown to take up (more) equity stake 
when firms are in difficulty (James, 1995; Berlin et al., 1996). To reduce this problem, we lag our 
independent variables (e.g., Klasa, 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). In this case, we collect 
our data for these variables at yeart-2 relative to the financial distress yeart. The rationale for 
adopting a two-year-lag is to align with our measure of financial distress as developed using the 
approach in Pindado et al. (2008). In particular, since the criterion for the financial distress measure 
is that the firm must have been in decline for two consecutive years, we need to capture the effects 
of the variables prior to the first year of decline leading to financial distress (i.e., 2 years before 
this outcome). This helps to reduce the effects of changes, for example to bank power, block 
ownership or board independence, that may have been instituted at the first sign of decline.  
 
5. Empirical tests and results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2, we report the summary descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A presents the 
statistics for distressed and non-distressed firms and examines whether they statistically differ in 
terms of bank power, measures of block ownership and board independence, and control variables. 
In Panel B, we compare whether firms with bank power differ with their counterparts. In both 
panels, we use the parametric t-test. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 






Panel A shows that distressed firms are more likely than non-distressed firms to have a powerful 
bank (Bank Power). We observe that 44.7% and 22.4% of distressed and non-distressed firms, 
respectively, have bank power (significant at 1%). Thus, at the univariate level, this is consistent 
with our hypothesis 1. In relation to block ownership variables, the mean total ownership by all 
blockholders (Total blocks) between the two groups is not significantly different. As for type of 
block ownership, whilst distressed firms have greater ownership by pressure sensitive and 
pressure resistant blocks, the two groups have similar nonfinancial block ownership. The number 
of blockholders is different between the groups, but the Herfindahl index is not significant. In 
terms of the top three blockholders, only Block 3 differs. Overall, it appears that distressed firms 
have bank power presence and slightly greater block ownership than non-distressed firms.  
For board independence, non-distressed firms are more likely to have CEO/Chair duality, 
but distressed firms are more likely to have proprietary director chair. Non-distressed firms have 
more Outside directors than distressed firms. When we split outside directors, we observe that 
non-distressed firms have more independent directors, while distressed firms have slightly more 
proprietary directors. Finally, managerial ownership in distressed firms is greater, and non-
distressed firms have higher profitability and retained earnings, and lower financial expense ratio. 
 In Panel B, we observe that bank power firms are more likely to be distressed at 75% 
compared to 45.5% for non-bank power firms. No significant differences are detected between the 
two groups in respect of Total blocks, but bank power firms have greater ownership by pressure 
sensitive blocks whilst non-bank power firms appear to have slightly greater ownership by 
pressure resistant and nonfinancial blocks. Bank power firms have a larger number of blocks and 
greater ownership by the top three individual blocks and are more likely to have CEO/Chair or 
proprietary board chair. Non-bank power firms have more outside directors, independent directors 
and proprietary directors. Finally, non-bank power firms have higher profitability and retained 
earnings, but lower financial expense ratio than bank power firms.  
 
5.2 Variable correlations 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variables.  
 
 






Insert Table 3 about here 
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The table shows that the correlations among the variables are generally low. In addition, we also 
inspected the variance inflation factors (VIF) (not tabulated) and found them to be low. As a rule 
of thumb, collinearity becomes a problem when the correlations and the VIFs exceed 0.90 and 10, 
respectively (see Greene, 2017). The highest correlations are between CEO/Chair and Proprietary 
director chair (r=-568) and independent and proprietary directors (r=-0.453). These magnitudes 
are well below the benchmarks, indicating no concerns about potential multicollinearity problems.  
 
5.3 Results of conditional logistic regression analyses 
We now turn to exploring the effects of bank power on financial distress likelihood and the 
monitoring role of block ownership and board independence. We start by testing whether our 
financial distress likelihood measure is related to financial factors as in prior financial distress 
prediction models (see Opler and Titman, 1994; Pindado et al., 2008; Hernandez-Tinoco and 
Wilson, 2013). Our results (not tabulated here) are consistent with the literature, and in the correct 
direction—profitability and retained earnings are negative, and financial expense ratio is positive. 
This gives us reasonable confidence that our financial distress measure is valid. In the following 
sections, we analyse the results of testing our hypotheses as observed in Table 4. 
 
5.3.1 Bank power and financial distress—Hypothesis 1 
In this section, we explore the effects of bank power on the likelihood of financial distress. We 
start by running a reduced form of Equation 1 that excludes interaction terms as in most prior 
similar studies. The results are reported in Table 4.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
  
In column 1 of Table 4, we estimate the effects of block equity ownership by banks (Bank blocks) 
on financial distress consistent with some prior studies examining the effects of bank power on 





firm outcomes (e.g., Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011; Pan and Tian, 2015). The results show that 
although the coefficient of bank ownership is positive, it is not significant.5 This suggests that 
while bank ownership may lower performance as in these prior studies, this may not translate into 
financial distress. However, these results may be because share ownership alone may only be 
capturing one dimension of bank power—equity holding, but not debt holding.  
 In this paper, our position is that bank power derives from holding both equity and debt 
rather than just an equity stake, and it is that power that may have effects on the likelihood of 
financial distress—our hypothesis 1. Columns 2 to 8 of Table 4 present the regression results of 
testing this hypothesis using a dummy variable to capture bank power. In column 2, we report the 
estimates with Total blocks and outside directors to test whether the level of total block ownership 
and the total outside directors matter for financial distress. The model in column 3 is a variant of 
that in column 2, but splits Total blocks into pressure sensitive blocks, pressure resistant blocks 
and non-financial blocks, and outside directors into proprietary and independent directors. This 
split is aimed to help understanding of whether the type of blockholder and type of outside director 
has implications for financial distress. This is supported by the rationale that prior studies suggest 
blockholders have different monitoring incentives (Thomsen et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2007). We 
report in columns 4 and 5, the estimates for the models that include, respectively, the combined 
total of the top three block ownership (Top3 blocks) and each of the individual top three 
blockholders (i.e., Block 1, Block 2 and Block 3). These estimates help to capture not only the 
effects of the total size of ownership by the top largest blockholders, but potentially also the effects 
of their type (Basu et al., 2017). This approach is supported by the multiple blockholder literature 
that suggests that additional blockholders contest rent extraction by the controlling power (see 
Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Basu et al., 2016, 2017). Models in columns 6 and 7 capture the impact 
of blockholder dispersion as measured in the number of blockholders and Herfindahl index, 
respectively—the literature suggests that these matter for monitoring (see Tribo et al., 2007; 
Konijn et al., 2011; Basu et al., 2016). Finally, in column 8, we split proprietary directors into 
types based on appointing blockholders—(i) pressure resistant blocks (PropResist directors), (ii) 
 
5 It is a possibility that it is the presence of bank ownership rather than ownership itself. This is particularly so given that banks sometimes are 
holders of proxy votes which may increase their voting power. Therefore, we rerun the model replacing bank ownership with a dummy variable 
measured as 1 if a bank is a blockholder, and 0, otherwise. The results remain positive and insignificant.  





pressure sensitive blocks (PropSensist directors) and (iii) non-financial blocks (PropNon-fin 
directors). Our rationale is to understand whether their monitoring effectiveness differ. 
All the model configurations are significant in explaining financial distress as indicated by 
model χ2 statistics (significant at 5%) and all the coefficients are consistently stable throughout. 
In spite of the model specification, the coefficients of Bank power are positive and significant at 
1% level. This provides support for Hypothesis 1. These results are consistent with the literature 
on bank dual holding and firm value (e.g., Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011; Pan and Tian, 2015) 
and support the notion that firms in which banks have power are more likely to enter financial 
distress. They also support theories proffered by Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Berlin et al. (1996), among others, where-in banks are argued to extract rents from borrower firms. 
This implies that bank power may be detrimental to firm survival. One way by which the bank can 
influence decisions is via its proprietary directors. We therefore rerun the models replacing bank 
power dummy with the proportion of the dual bank proprietary directors, but the results are 
insignificant in all specifications. We thus do not explore this issue any further.  
With respect to the block ownership and board independence variables, we find that except 
for Block 1 and Block 2 (column 5) and block dispersion as measured in number of blocks (column 
6) and Herfindahl index (column 7), all other variables are not significant.6 The results for Blocks 
1 and 2, number of blocks and Herfindahl index are significant at 5%. These results are consistent 
with the multiple blockholder literature that documents that additional blockholders monitor and 
countervailing the effects of the controlling power (e.g., Pajuste and Maury, 2005; Attig et al., 
2008; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010; Basu et al., 2016). They are also consistent with studies 
suggesting that high blockholder dispersion weakens the ability of blockholder monitoring (Tribo 
et al., 2007; Konijn et al., 2011; Basu et al., 2017). 
 
5.3.2 Bank power, block ownership and board independence 
Thus far, our results as reported in Table 4 are consistent with the notion that banks use their power 
to extract rents. However, similar to most prior studies examining the effects of banks on firm 
outcomes (e.g., Morck et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011; Pan and Tian, 2015), our 
 
6 Our non-financial blocks combine individual and corporate blocks. However, Basu et al. (2017) notes that individual blocks have opposite effects 
on monitoring. Consequently, we split the non-financial blocks into individual blocks and corporate blocks. Both are not significant and are in same 
direction as the total non-financial blocks. We therefore do not pursue this distinction any further. 





analyses do not capture the monitoring of bank actions by blockholders and boards of directors. 
As we argued in Section 3, the ability of the bank to extract rents is dependent upon monitoring 
by blockholders and boards. Put another way, the bank power effects on the likelihood of financial 
distress are moderated by block ownership and board structures. We address this by running the 
regression including interaction terms (full Equation 1). We first centre all the continuous block 
ownership and board independence variables and run the regressions with centred variables as 
recommended in Aiken and West (1991) to reduce the effects of multicollinearity inherent in 
interaction models. Our inspection of the VIFs shows that they are all below the 10 thresholds. 
The results are presented in Table 5. Our results on bank power are maintained across all 
specifications. We discuss the results of the interactions in the following subsections.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.3.2.1 The role of block ownership—Hypothesis 2 
While bank power is associated with the likelihood of financial distress, thus supporting 
Hypothesis 1, it is premature to suggest that bank power precipitates financial distress. We argued 
in Hypothesis 2 that the extent to which bank power harms the firm depends upon the contests by 
blockholders. If the contests are strong, we would expect the likelihood of financial distress due 
to bank power to be lower, and if they are weak, then financial distress due to bank power is 
magnified. In our models, these effects are captured by the interaction terms.  
We start the analyses of the results in Table 5 by examining the effects of measures of 
blockholder power based on the level of block equity ownership (Total blocks, PresSensit blocks, 
PresResist blocks, Non-financial blocks, Top3 blocks and Block 1, Block 2, Block 3). These are all 
similar to Table 4. However, when we examine the interaction terms, the results show that Total 
blocks*Bank power (columns 1, 5-7), PresResist blocks*Bank power (column 2) and Block 1*Bank 
power (column 4) are significant. PresSensit blocks*Bank power and Non-financial blocks*Bank 
power (columns 2), Top3 blocks*Bank power (column 3) and Block 2*Bank power and Block 
3*Bank power (column 4) are not significant although negative. These findings suggest that the 
contests of bank power by blockholders are primarily driven by pressure resistant blockholders 
who also appear to be the first largest blockholder (Block 1). This is consistent with the literature 





that argues that pressure sensitive blocks and non-financial blocks are subject to agency problems, 
for example, due to their business relationships with the firm (Cornett et al., 2007; Bhattacharya 
and Graham, 2009) or just passive monitors of the bank power actions. 
In relation to blockholder dispersion, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant for the Number of blocks*Bank power while it is negative and significant for the 
Herfindahl index*Bank power (columns 5 and 6 respectively). This implies that for firms with 
high blockholder dispersion, contests by blockholders to bank power actions are weakened with 
implications for financial distress (see Tribo et al., 2007; Konijn et al., 2011).  
The preceding results are consistent with blockholders using their power to contest bank 
actions and reducing financial distress. However, they do not tell us whether these contests are 
strong enough to eliminate financial distress due to bank power actions. We explore this by 
examining the sum of the coefficients of bank power and the interaction terms, which are reported 
in Panel B of Table 5. The total of bank power and the interaction term for total block ownership 
(Total Blocks*Bank power, β1+β20), pressure resistant blocks (PresResist blocks*Bank power, 
β1+β22) and first largest blockholder (Block 1*Bank power, β1+β27) are significant at 10% level. 
This suggests that contests by blockholders are strong enough to off-set the bank power effects on 
financial distress. For blockholder dispersion, the total effects are positive and significant for 
Number of blocks*Bank power (β1+β24) and Herfindahl index*Bank power (β1+β25). This is in line 
with the multiple blockholders literature (see Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Tribo et al., 2007; Basu et 
al., 2016). Taking all this together, our findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.3.3 The role of board independence—Hypothesis 3 
In our third hypothesis (H3), we posited that bank power effects on financial distress depend on 
the independence of the board. Thus, strong board independence would reduce financial distress 
due to bank power actions. As earlier noted, our proxies for board independence are CEO/Chair 
duality, Proprietary director chair and Outside directors.  
 With respect to CEO/Chair duality, we find that the interaction term, CEO/Chair 
duality*bank power, is positive, and not significant. As for proprietary chair director, Proprietary 
director chair*bank power is positive and highly significant. Both the sum of the coefficients of 
bank power and CEO/Chair duality*bank power (β1 + β30) and Proprietary director chair*bank 
power (β1 + β31) are also positive and significant. These results suggest that the effects of bank 





power are significantly higher for firms in which the position of chair is held by the CEO or 
proprietary director. In other words, financial distress due to bank power is more likely in firms 
with a CEO/chair or proprietary board chair. This suggests that banks may influence decisions in 
their favour via the CEO/Chair or proprietary director chair as appropriate. This is supported by 
Franks and Mayer (1998) who, in the context Germany, show that powerful banks were able to 
influence decisions via (their) supervisory board chairs. Similarly, examining Chinese firms, Luo 
et al. (2011) document evidence suggesting that banks facilitate better perks for the CEO to 
motivate them to implement strategies that benefit the bank. The reality is that not all CEO/Chairs 
or proprietary director board chairs are prone to bank influence. Hence, we explore our dataset to 
provide insights into the identities of the board chairs in order to understand whose interests they 
may be serving (We can only do this for proprietary director chairs as it is difficult to determine 
who the CEO/chair is aligned to). In our dataset, we have 44 proprietary board chairs, of which 
five (5) are aligned to pressure resistant blockholders and 39 to non-financial blocks (7 are 
corporate blocks and 32 are individual blocks)—none representing the powerful bank (or any other 
banks). Non-financial blocks are often characterised as associates with incentives for private 
benefits (Thomsen et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2007) and their appointed proprietary director chairs 
may be driving our results. We rerun the models by replacing the original proprietary chair dummy 
(based on 44 proprietary chairs) with a dummy based on the 39 non-financial blocks proprietary 
director chairs. The results (not tabulated here) remain. It therefore appears that the powerful banks 
may find it easier to form a coalition with these chairs to drive board decisions in their favour. It 
is possible that these proprietary director chairs suffer from conflicts of interests due to business 
ties that their principal blocks may have with the firm (Thomsen et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2007; 
Tribo et al., 2007) and that such ties rely on the influence of the powerful bank to materialise.   
In relation to outside directors, the results in columns 1, 5 and 6 show that the coefficient of 
the interaction term, Outside directors*Bank power is negative and significant at the 10% level 
suggesting some level of contests to bank power. The sum of the coefficients, β1 + β32, is negative, 
but not significant. This indicates that contests by outside directors is enough to off-set financial 
distress due to bank power. To understand where this contest derives from, we rerun the 
regressions by splitting outside directors into independent directors and proprietary directors 
(columns 2, 3 and 4). We also split proprietary directors into those representing (i) pressure 
resistant blocks (PropResist directors), (ii) pressure sensitive blocks (PropSensist directors) and 





(iii) non-financial blocks (PropNon-fin directors (column 7). We observe that the coefficients of 
independent directors*bank power and proprietary directors*bank power are both negative, but 
only proprietary directors*bank power is significant at 5%. The sum of the coefficients, β1 + β34, 
is negative and significant at 10%. These results suggest that the contests by outside directors are 
primarily due to proprietary directors. These findings are consistent with other studies that show 
the importance of proprietary directors in monitoring (e.g., Pucheta-Martinez and Garcia-Meca, 
2014; Manzaneque et al., 2016; Fuente et al., 2017). In column 7, we show that the coefficient of 
PropResist directors*Bank power, is negative and significant, but those of PropSensist directors 
and PropNon-fin directors, though negative, are insignificant. The results on PropNon-fin 
directors may be due to proprietary director chairs. Hence, we recalculate our measure eliminating 
proprietary director chairs and whilst the coefficient improves, it is still insignificant. Nevertheless, 
we suggest that proprietary directors contest bank actions and that such contests are likely to come, 
in the main, from those appointed by pressure resistant blockholders. 
 
5.4 Robustness checks   
The results in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the notion that bank power increases the likelihood 
of financial distress. However, it is possible that there are alternative explanations for these results. 
In this section, we run additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, prior work 
documents that banks take up equity stakes when firms are in financial difficulties (e.g., Gilson, 
1990; James, 1995; Berlin et al., 1996) and that the costs of financial distress are lower for firms 
in which banks are both lender and equity holder (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1990). Thus, having bank 
power in the firm might not be random—that is, firms that are likely to enter financial distress 
might have incentives to have the bank take up both debt and equity. Hence, our tests potentially 
suffer from a selection bias (Heckman, 1979, Chung et al., 2015). Although, we have two-year 
lagged our independent variables to reduce this endogeneity concern, lagging variables may not 
be enough (e.g., Bellemare et al., 2015). We address this concern by estimating a two-staged 
Heckman 1979 model in similar fashion to Chung et al. (2015). In the first stage, we estimate the 
following probit model which models the decision to hold both equity and debt in the same firm.  
 
Bank powert = β0 + β1Log total assetst-2 + β2PresSensit blockst-2 + β3PreResist blockst-2  
  + β4Nonfinancial blockst-2 + β5CEO/Chairt-2 + β6Outside directorst-2  





  + β7Managerial ownershipt-2 + β8Financial expenset-2 + β9Profitabilityt-2  
  + β10Retained earningst-3 + β11Industry controls + Ɛ        (2) 
 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. The model is based on the findings of prior studies. James 
(1995) show that banks hold shares in large firms (Log total assets) and high leverage firms 
(financial expense ratio). Bank ownership has been found to be related to performance 
(profitability; retained earnings) and inside ownership (managerial ownership) (Limpaphayom 
and Polwitoon, 2004; Barucci and Mattesini, 2008; Lin et al., 2009). We also add block ownership 
variables and outside directors as governance structures have implications for the firm’s capital 
structure (Granado-Peiro and Lopez-Gracia, 2017). In the second stage, we use the estimates from 
Equation 2 to compute the inverse Mills ratio (InvMills) (as in Heckman, 1979), which we 
introduce in Equation 1 as an additional variable. The results are reported in Table 6 and are similar 
to those reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Second, the financial distress metric we employed in our analyses is an ex-ante measure based on 
Pindado et al. (2008). Although this ex-ante measure is considered reliable because it captures 
both accounting and market variables (see Hernandez-Tinoco and Wilson, 2013), the results may 
be driven by the measure used. We therefore perform robustness checks using an alternative 
measure of financial distress. Specifically, we employ a measure of financial distress based on the 
Altman’s Z-Score model, an approach used in other previous studies to perform robustness checks 
(see Pindado et al., 2008; Hernandez-Tinoco and Wilson, 2013). We use the model as modified by 
Lizarraga-Dallo (1998) for the Spanish market. This model classifies 79 (42.9%) of our sample 
firms as distressed and 105 (57.1%) as non-distressed. We then run a logit model which includes 
all variables in Equation 1 as well as additional control variables in log of total assets, industry and 
year dummies. The results are reported in Table 7.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 






Reassuringly, the results are similar to those obtained using the measure of financial distress based 
on Pindado et al. (2008). The exceptions are: the number of blocks and Herfindahl index change 
to 1% significance level, PresSensit blocks*Bank power is now significant at 10%; and managerial 
ownership is not significant. Nevertheless, the direction of the coefficients remains unaltered.  
 Finally, we also run further additional tests for which the results are not tabulated here. It is 
possible that smaller firms, being riskier can only borrow from banks while larger firms have other 
sources of external funding. Hence, our findings may be driven by this size effect. Whilst this 
problem is somewhat dealt with via our matched sample design and the conditional regression 
approach, we undertake tests to provide confidence that this effect does not influence our results. 
We create a dummy variable firm size by dividing our sample into small and large firms via the 
median total assets (and also market capitalisation) and run t-tests comparing the ratio of bank debt 
to total debt of the two groups of firms. We find no significant differences suggesting that the size 
effect is not an issue. We also introduce additional variables in board size, audit committee size, 
board meetings and the proportion of female directors and our results remain largely similar. To 
the extent that our results are not qualitatively different in all these checks, we are reasonably 
confident that our results are robust. 
  
6. Concluding remarks 
We examine the effects of bank power (proxied by the holding of both debt and equity in the same 
firm) on the likelihood of financial distress in Spanish listed firms. We suggested following most 
recent literature that banks may deploy their power to extract rents from the firm, leading to 
financial distress. However, we also draw from the literature on multiple blockholders and board 
structure and argue that the ability of the bank to extract rents and push the firm into financial 
distress is contested by blockholder power and the board. Thus, rent extraction cannot persist to 
harm the firm. Using a matched sample of distressed and non-distressed firms and applying a 
conditional logistic regression model, we obtain results that are consistent with our hypotheses. 
These results are robust to endogeneity and other additional sensitivity tests.  
 We find that bank power is positively related to the likelihood financial distress. This implies 
that holding other effects constant, banks holding both equity stakes and debt may be detrimental 
to the firm. This is consistent with the conflict of interest between debt- and equity-holders. 





However, bank power actions are contested in firms with higher block ownership and greater board 
independence. In relation to block ownership, the contests are primarily due to pressure resistant 
blockholders, and these are likely to be the largest blockholder in the firm. With respect to board 
independence, the presence of a proprietary director chair of the board magnifies the bank power 
effects on financial distress. Outside directors reduce the effects of bank power, but these are 
primarily due to proprietary directors. These results are consistent with the notion that bank power 
actions may harm the firm, but block ownership and boards contest value destroying actions.  
Our paper contributes to ongoing research that focuses on the effects of equity ownership by 
banks as well as to the corporate governance literature in general. The findings also provide useful 
guidance to policy makers about governance structures that enhance protection of stakeholders. 
For example, regulators could consider strengthening the law that limits the banks’ legal rights in 
the event of failures when they are both equity and debtholder in the firm. They are also useful to 
investors’ understanding of settings under which expropriation is more likely. Thus, they inform 
investors about conditions where powerful actors may be detrimental to the firm. 
As with all studies, our findings and the related contributions must be understood in the 
context of some limitations. First, our sample focused only on the Spanish environment, thus 
limiting generalisability of the findings. Whilst the Spanish setting makes interesting analysis, 
future research could build on our study by extending the analysis to an international setting. 
Second, we limited our focus on understanding financial distress likelihood. Future work could 
extend by examining whether firms went into bankruptcy and understand the role of the powerful 
banks in this context. Related to this, future research could examine other organisational outcomes, 
for example, performance. Third, our sample is rather small, thus affecting the power of our tests. 
However, small samples are not unusual in studies of this nature (see Peasnell et al., 2001). Despite 
these limitations, our work contributes to the literature and has policy and practical implications. 
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Our measure of financial distress is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
financially distressed firms, and 0 for the non-distressed (control) firms.  
Bank power and Governance variables 
Bank power 
 
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is both lender and shareholder in the 




Denotes constructs that capture the power of all large non-dual bank blockholders 
owning 5% or more of the firm’s outstanding shares at year t-2 relative to year of 
financial distress. These constructs are:  
(i) Total block share ownership—the combined ownership by all blockholders owning 
at least 5% of shareholdings (Total blocks), which is then split in pressure sensitive 
financial blocks (PresSensit blocks), pressure resistant financial blocks (PresResist 
blocks), and non-financial blockholders (Non-financial blocks) 
(ii) Blockholder dispersion, measured in the number of blocks and Herfindahl index (see 
note 4 in the paper) 
(iii) Top three largest block ownership—the total combined ownership of the top three 
largest blockholders (Top3Blocks). This is also split into the individual top three 
largest blockholders (Block 1, Block 2 and Block 3). 
Board independence 
 
Reflects the independence of the board as proxied by three constructs as follows: 
(i) CEO/Chair—a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairman and 
CEO are combined, and 0 otherwise, at year t-2 relative to year of financial distress. 
(ii) Proprietary chair—a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairman is a 
proprietary director and 0 otherwise, at year t-2 relative to year of financial distress. 
(iii) Outside directors—the proportion of outside directors, calculated as the number of 
non-dual-bank outside directors scaled by the total number of directors on board of 
directors at year t-2 relative to year of financial distress. This is split into independent 
directors and proprietary directors. 
Block ownership*Bank power; 
Board independence*Bank power 
The product of multiplying bank power by each of the corporate governance variables 




The percentage of shares directly held by all executive directors at the financial year-end 




The firm’s earnings before interest and taxes for the year scaled by the replacement value 
of total assets7 at year t-2 relative to year of financial distress (as in Pindado et al., 2008).  
 
7 According to Pindado et al. (2008), the replacement value of total assets (RATit)is preferred because, unlike the book value of assets, it is not 
dependent upon accounting policies of the firm—thus it is less biased. Our computed is discussed in Pindado et al. (2008, p. 1002-1003) in the 
following way:  RATit = RFit + (TAit − BFit), where RFit is the replacement value of tangible fixed assets, TAit is the book value of total assets, and 
BFit is the book value of tangible fixed assets. Similar to Pindado et al. (2008), we obtain the book value of total assets (TAit) and the book value 
of tangible assets (BFit) from the balance sheet. RFit is computed as: RFit = RFit-1 [(1+ ϕt)/(1+ δit)]+ Iit. RFit0 = BFit0 and t0 is the first year of the 
chosen period; δit = Dit/BFit, where Dit  is the book depreciation expense and BFit is the  book value of tangible fixed assets in the period t; and 
ϕt = (GCGPt − GCGPt − 1)/GCGPt − 1) where GCGPt is the growth of capital goods prices reported in the Main Economic Indicators published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The data we use is obtained from firm’s annual report and from the Spanish 
National Statistics Institute. 







Financial expense captures the leverage effect and is measured as interest paid for the 
year scaled to the replacement value of total assets at year t-2 relative to year of financial 
distress (see Pindado et al., 2008). We use the natural log to reduce the effects of outliers. 
Retained earnings 
 
Total retained earnings of a firm over its entire life scaled to the replacement value of 
total assets (see Pindado et al., 2008), both measured at year t-3. The use of year t-3 in 
calculating this variable is to avoid overlaps with the profitability measure above which 
is measured at year t-2. 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Panel A: Financially vs non-financially distressed firms (=184 firms) 
 
Variables 
Financially distressed firms Non-financially distressed firms  
T-Tests Mean Median 25% 75% SDev  Mean Median 25% 75% SDev. 
Bank power 0.447 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.422 0.224 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.419 2.924*** 
Total blocks 0.366 0.361 0.137 0.588 0.252 0.342 0.315 0.128 0.569 0.243 0.172 
PresSensit blocks 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.081 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.074 1.649** 
PresResist blocks 0.129 0.053 0.000 0.147 0.196 0.092 0.050 0.000 0.127 0.136 1.481* 
Non-financial blocks 0.187 0.128 0.000 0.285 0.198 0.218 0.116 0.000 0.395 0.236 -0.972 
Number of blockholders 2.728 2.000 1.000 4.000 2.033 2.207 2.000 1.000 3.000 1.745 1.868** 
Herfindahl index 0.555 0.504 0.359 0.802 0.307 0.588 0.542 0.369 1.000 0.323 -0.699 
Top3 blocks 0.355 0.285 0.125 0.555 0.312 0.377 0.275 0.125 0.580 0.349 0.453 
Block 1 0.206 0.155 0.070 0.310 0.191 0.217 0.150 0.081 0.320 0.188 -0.399 
Block 2 0.073 0.070 0.000 0.100 0.074 0.06 0.050 0.000 0.090 0.079 0.964 
Block 3 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.055 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.038 1.398* 
CEO/Chair  0.652 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.501 0.673 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.471 -0.310 
Proprietary director chair 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.429 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.338 2.908*** 
Outside directors 0.582 0.667 0.317 0.833 0.295 0.697 0.759 0.581 0.871 0.226 -2.755*** 
Independent directors 0.316 0.317 0.200 0.423 0.179 0.391 0.364 0.279 0.500 0.178 -2.827*** 
Proprietary directors 0.372 0.359 0.238 0.500 0.233 0.337 0.333 0.191 0.538 0.225 0.789 
Managerial ownership 0.030 0.0003 0.000 0.005 0.086 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.060 1.015 
Profitability -0.011 -0.008 -0.024 0.012 0.135 0.080 0.056 0.023 0.098 0.107 -5.108*** 
Financial expense 0.035 0.029 0.017 0.042 0.034 0.017 0.009 0.004 0.020 0.036 3.409*** 
Retained earnings 0.181 0.101 0.030 0.256 0.270 0.353 0.257 0.115 0.592 0.296 -4.129*** 
Panel B: Bank power vs non-bank power firms (=184 firms) 
 
Variables 
Bank Power firms Non-bank power firms  
T-Tests Mean Median 25% 75% SDev. Mean Median 25% 75% SDev. 
Financial distress 0.750 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.499 0.355 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.441 2.924*** 
Total blocks 0.388 0.380 0.206 0.567 0.205 0.348 0.327 0.124 0.584 0.254 -0.561 
PresSensit blocks 0.129 0.104 0.053 0.165 0.092 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 7.411*** 
PresResist blocks 0.087 0.053 0.000 0.091 0.140 0.115 0.050 0.000 0.136 0.174 -0.804 





Non-financial blocks 0.172 0.138 0.027 0.285 0.163 0.208 0.125 0.000 0.285 0.227 -0.800 
Number of blockholders 3.357 3.000 3.000 4.000 1.224 2.308 2.000 1.000 3.000 1.966 2.727*** 
Herfindahl index 0.571 0.506 0.445 0.649 0.244 0.572 0.507 0.359 1.000 0.327 -0.014 
Top3 blocks 0.331 0.235 0.12 0.450 0.328 0.373 0.280 0.125 0.580 0.331 0.611 
Block 1 0.142 0.095 0.000 0.225 0.151 0.224 0.160 0.081 0.325 0.193 -2.117** 
Block 2 0.082 0.070 0.050 0.095 0.082 0.065 0.060 0.000 0.090 0.075 1.042 
Block 3 0.048 0.500 0.000 0.080 0.040 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.048 1.966** 
CEO/Chair  0.484 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.420 0.513 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.417 -0.620 
Proprietary director chair 0.516 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.360 -7.792*** 
Outside directors 0.343 0.326 0.191 0.483 0.212 0.693 0.775 0.586 0.871 0.242 -7.788*** 
Independent directors 0.315 0.286 0.146 0.456 0.198 0.360 0.333 0.250 0.444 0.178 -1.215 
Proprietary directors 0.283 0.275 0.152 0.410 0.181 0.367 0.344 0.211 0.542 0.237 -1.696** 
Managerial ownership 0.026 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.078 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.039 -0.727 
Profitability -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 0.031 0.015 0.056 0.041 -0.007 0.068 0.138 -1.643* 
Financial expense 0.027 0.019 0.004 0.034 0.032 0.022 0.018 0.006 0.032 0.069 -0.687 
Retained earnings 0.239 0.176 0.076 0.297 0.267 0.272 0.183 0.053 0.422 0.301 -0.546 
***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and 
equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Total blocks 
= % shares owned by all non-dual bank blockholders; PresSensit blocks= % shares owned by pressure sensitive blocks (other than dual bank 
bank); PresResist blocks= % shares  owned by pressure resistant blocks; Non-financial blocks =% shares owned by nonfinancial blockholders; 
Number of blocks=number of blocks; Herfindahl index=Herfindahl index of equity shares; Top3 blocks=% shares owned by the top three 
blockholders; Block 1, 2, 3= % shares owned by first, second and third block, respectively; CEO/Chair duality=a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for role duality, and 0 otherwise; Proprietary director chair=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for proprietary chair, and 0 
otherwise; Outside boards= % non-dual bank outside directors; Independence directors=% of independent directors on the board; Proprietary 
directors=% of non-dual bank proprietary directors; Managerial ownership=% shares held by executive directors; Profitability=PBIT scaled by 
the replacement value of total assets; Financial expense=interest paid scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Retained earnings=total 
retained earnings scaled by the replacement value of total assets.





Table 3:  Correlation matrix 








7 8 9 10 11 12 13            14 
1. Bank power 1.000             
2. Total blocks -.058  1.000            
3. PresSensit blocks -.031    .250 1.000           
4. PresResist blocks -.060    .426 -.019 1.000          
5. Non-financial blocks    -.059    .689  .072 -.288 1.000         
6. CEO/Chair -.046 .076  .153  .056  -.093 1.000        
7. Proprietary director chair -.007 -.038 -.103 .003 .211 -.568 1.000       
8. Outside directors -.399    .045 -.399  .118   .038 -.117 .078 1.000      
9. Independent directors -.089   -.045 -.116 -.052 -.007  .126 -.171   .336 1.000     
10. Proprietary directors -.125    .321  .141  .184   .202 -.230 .219   .249 -.453 1.000    
11. Managerial ownership -.054   -.111 -.069 -.110 -.033  .055 -.062 -.018  .026 -.146 1.000   
12. Profitability -.120   -.015  .024   .035 -.042 -.007 -.045  .153 -.067  .112 -.090 1.000  
13. Financial expense -.051   -.066 -.089   .005 -.076 -.103 .165  .057 -.111  .102  .070 -.164  1.000 
14. Retained earnings -.040   -.038 -.013   .059 -.086 .262 -.239  .107  .054 -.009  .012  .225 -.0051     1.000 
Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Total blocks = % shares owned by all non-
dual bank blockholders; PresSensit blocks= % shares  owned by pressure sensitive blocks (other than dual bank bank); PresResist blocks= % shares  
owned by pressure resistant blocks; Non-financial blocks =% shares owned by nonfinancial blockholders; CEO/Chair duality=a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for role duality, and 0 otherwise; Proprietary director chair=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for proprietary 
chair, and 0 otherwise; Outside boards= % non-dual bank outside directors; Independence directors=% of independent directors on the board; 
Proprietary directors=% of non-dual bank proprietary directors; Managerial ownership=% shares held by executive directors; Profitability=PBIT 
scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Financial expense=interest paid scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Retained 
earnings=total retained earnings scaled by the replacement value of total assets. 
 





Table 4: Results of conditional logistic regression on the effects of bank power and corporate governance structure on financial distress 
likelihood: Reduced Equation 1   
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
   




























       
Nonbank financial blocks 1.575 
(1.904) 
       
PresSensit blocks 
 
  -1.913 
(3.035) 
     
PresResist blocks 
 
  -1.807 
(2.463) 
     




     





Herfindahl index                               -1.243** 
(0.583) 
 
Top3 blocks    -0.638 
(0.586) 
    
Block 1                                           -2.610** 
(1.249) 
   
Block 2     -6.909* 
(3.748) 
   
Block 3     6.057 
(5.188) 









































































PropResit directors        -2.843** 
(1.403) 
PropSensit directors        -0.259 
(3.077) 
PropNon-fin directors        -1.469 
(2.162) 




































































         
Number of firms 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Log likelihood -38.269 -35.101 -32.815 -33.722 -31.411 -33.893 -33.866 -34.057 
Model χ2 29.91*** 30.69*** 27.85*** 19.72*** 41.97*** 30.72*** 36.62*** 35.84*** 
Pseudo R2 0.404 0.453 0.489 0.475 0.511 0.472 0.472 0.469 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and 
equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-
holder, and 0 otherwise; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Total blocks = % shares owned by all non-dual bank 
blockholders; PresSensit blocks= % shares owned by pressure sensitive blocks (other than dual bank bank); PresResist blocks= % shares  owned by pressure resistant blocks; Non-
financial blocks =% shares owned by nonfinancial blockholders; Number of blocks=number of blocks; Herfindahl index=Herfindahl index of equity shares; Top3 blocks=% shares 
owned by the top three blockholders; Block 1, 2, 3= % shares owned by first, second and third block, respectively; CEO/Chair duality=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for role duality, and 0 otherwise; Proprietary director chair=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for proprietary chair, and 0 otherwise; Outside boards= % non-dual bank 
outside directors; Independence directors=% of independent directors on the board; Proprietary directors=% of non-dual bank proprietary directors; Managerial ownership=% 
shares held by executive directors; Profitability=PBIT scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Financial expense=interest paid scaled by the replacement value of total 
assets; Retained earnings=total retained earnings scaled by the replacement value of total assets.






Table 5: Results of conditional logistic regression on the effects of bank power and corporate governance structure on financial distress 
likelihood: Moderation model   
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Panel A: Individual and moderation effects 

































     
Non-financial blocks   0.336 
(1.088) 
     





Herfindahl index                              -1.524** 
(0.727) 
 
Top3 blocks   -0.287 
(0.670) 
    
Block 1                                          -3.123** 
(1.518) 
   
Block 2    -9.658* 
(5.460) 
   
Block 3    5.817 
(6.462) 

































































PropResit directors       -2.477** 
(2.214) 
PropSensit directors       0.933 
(3.084) 
PropNon-fin directors       -0.608 
(2.278) 




























































Total blocks*Bank power β20 -5.829** 
(3.461) 
   -6.757** 
(3.356) 




PresSensit blocks*Bank power β21  -10.781 
(8.208) 
    
 
 
PresResist blocks*Bank power β22  -9.533** 
(4.085) 
     
Non-financial blocks*Bank power β23  -2.519 
(3.687) 
     
Number of blocks*Bank power β24         2.286** 
(1.154) 
  
Herfindahl*Bank power         β25      -6.341** 
(2.995) 
 
Top3 blocks*Bank power    β26   -2.649 
(2.805) 
    
Block 1*Bank power           β27    -16.446** 
(7.095) 
   
Block 2*Bank power           β28            -1.554 
(6.425) 
   





Block 3*Bank power          β29    -12.925 
(13.322) 
   











































  -6.661 
(6.849) 






   
PropResit directors*Bank power       -11.719** 
(5.715) 
PropSensit directors*Bank power       -12.387 
(8.344) 
PropNon-fin directors*Bank power       -7.373 
(4.990) 
        
Number of firms 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Log likelihood -34.603 -29.516 -31.605 -26.780 -32.880 -31.927 -31.823 
Model χ2 776.46*** 464.31*** 516.27*** 284.72*** 693.54*** 605.54*** 398.20*** 
Pseudo R2 0.461 0.540 0.508 0.583 0.488 0.503 0.504 
Panel B: Wald tests of total effects of bank power 
 (β1 + β20) -3.156*    -4.105* -3.442*  
(β1 + β21)  -7.218      
(β1 + β22)  -5.97*      
(β1 + β23)  1.044      
(β1 + β24)     4.438*   
(β1 + β25)      -3.186**  
(β1 + β26)   0.760     
(β1 + β27)    -13.888*    
(β1 + β28)    1.004    
(β1 + β29)    -10.367    
(β1 + β30) 2.971* 2.072* 1.962* 5.162* 3.576** 2.967**  
(β1 + β31) 14.368*** 14.022*** 13.118*** 20.165*** 14.578*** 15.768***  
(β1 + β32) -3.796    -3.557 -3.617  
(β1 + β33)  0.032 0.601 5.980    
(β1 + β34)  -9.803* -7.952* -8.6313*    
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender 
and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and 
equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Total blocks = % shares owned by all non-
dual bank blockholders; PresSensit blocks= % shares owned by pressure sensitive blocks (other than dual bank bank); PresResist blocks= % shares  owned by pressure resistant 
blocks; Non-financial blocks =% shares owned by nonfinancial blockholders; Number of blocks=number of blocks; Herfindahl index=Herfindahl index of equity shares; Top3 
blocks=% shares owned by the top three blockholders; Block 1, 2, 3= % shares owned by first, second and third block, respectively; CEO/Chair duality=a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for role duality, and 0 otherwise; Proprietary director chair=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for proprietary chair, and 0 otherwise; Outside boards= 
% non-dual bank outside directors; Independence directors=% of independent directors on the board; Proprietary directors=% of non-dual bank proprietary directors; Managerial 
ownership=% shares held by executive directors; Profitability=PBIT scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Financial expense=interest paid scaled by the replacement 
value of total assets; Retained earnings=total retained earnings scaled by the replacement value of total assets.






Table 6: Endogeneity tests: Two-stage Heckman Model  
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log total assets 0.275* 
(0.164) 
     






































   




   
Number of blocks                          0.785** 
(0.391) 
  
Herfindahl index     -1.577** 
(0.823) 
 
Block 1                                            -3.209* 
(1.652) 
Block 2      -9.715* 
(5.295) 








































Independent directors   -1.262 
(2.902) 
  -0.615 
(2.610) 
Proprietary directors   1.320 
(2.593) 
  1.583 
(2.335) 
































































PresResist blocks*Bank power   -9.594** 
(4.050) 
   
Non-financial blocks*Bank power   -2.571 
(3.763) 
   





Herfindahl index*Bank power     -6.653** 
(3.077) 
 
Block 1*Bank power                                   -16.859** 
(6.811) 
Block 2*Bank power                                  -1.457 
(6.139) 
Block 3*Bank power                                     -13.175 
(12.837) 
































Independent directors*Bank power   -3.577 
(5.039) 
  3.357 
(6.001) 
Proprietary directors*Bank power   -13.494** 
(5.771) 
  -10.862** 
(5.203) 
Industry controls Yes      
Constant -4.074 
(2.630) 
     










       
Number of firms 184 184 184 184 184 184 
Log likelihood -35.634 -34.598 -29.485 -32.877 -31.820 -26.727 
Model χ2 58.75*** 969.53*** 440.52*** 760.72*** 561.70*** 248.05** 
Pseudo R2 0.502 0.461 0.541 0.488 0.504 0.584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and 
equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-
holder, and 0 otherwise; Bank power=a dummy taking the value of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Total blocks = % shares owned by all non-dual bank 
blockholders; PresSensit blocks= % shares owned by pressure sensitive blocks (other than dual bank bank); PresResist blocks= % shares  owned by pressure resistant blocks; Non-
financial blocks =% shares owned by nonfinancial blockholders; Number of blocks=number of blocks; Herfindahl index=Herfindahl index of equity shares; Top3 blocks=% shares 
owned by the top three blockholders; Block 1, 2, 3= % shares owned by first, second and third block, respectively; CEO/Chair duality=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for role duality, and 0 otherwise; Proprietary director chair=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for proprietary chair, and 0 otherwise; Outside boards= % non-dual bank 
outside directors; Independence directors=% of independent directors on the board; Proprietary directors=% of non-dual bank proprietary directors; Managerial ownership=% 
shares held by executive directors; Profitability=PBIT scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Financial expense=interest paid scaled by the replacement value of total 
assets; Retained earnings=total retained earnings scaled by the replacement value of total assets.






Table 7: Results of conditional logistic regression on the effects of bank power and corporate governance structures on financial distress 
likelihood: Re-estimation with Z-scores 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
































   
Non-financial blocks   0.295 
(0.925) 
   
Number of blocks                       0.882*** 
(0.321) 
  
Herfindahl index    -1.854*** 
(0.645) 
 
Block 1                                           -1.882 
(1.195) 
Block 2     -1.722 
(3.472) 


































Independent directors  0.436 
(1.310) 
   
Proprietary directors  0.566 
(1.054) 
   
























































PresResist blocks*Bank power  -12.413** 
(7.138) 
   
Non-financial blocks*Bank power  1.289 
(7.781) 
   





Herfindahl index*Bank power    -1.985** 
(0.899) 
 
Block 1*Bank power                                  -5.915* 
(5.470) 
Block 2*Bank power                                 63.720* 
(34.527) 
Block 3*Bank power                                    -62.806* 
(36.978) 




























Independent directors*Bank power  -25.769 
(17.613) 
   





Proprietary directors*Bank power  -32.064** 
(15.566) 
   





















      
Number of firms 184 184 184 184 184 
Log likelihood -104.188 -98.057 -101.010 -99.371 -95.945 
Model χ2 284.47*** 206.61*** 277.39*** 327.52*** 246.64*** 
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.223 0.199 0.213 0.240 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***; **; and * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Bank power=a dummy taking the value 
of 1 if bank is both lender and equity-holder, and 0 otherwise; Block ownership= % shares owned by all non-dual bank blockholders; Financial block 
ownership= % shares  owned by non-dual bank financial blockholders; Nonfinancial block ownership=% shares owned by nonfinancial blockholders; 
CEO/Chair duality=a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for role duality, and 0 otherwise; Outside boards= % non-dual bank outside directors; 
Board independence=% of independent directors; Proprietary directors=% of non-dual bank proprietary directors; Managerial ownership=% shares 
held by executive directors; Profitability=PBIT scaled by the replacement value of total assets; Financial expense=interest paid scaled by the 
replacement value of total assets; Retained earnings=total retained earnings scaled by the replacement value of total assets 
